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Abstract 
 
Although substantial research shows the importance of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) to export led growth in some developing countries, it cannot be assumed that 
TNC subsidiaries will automatically upgrade their capabilities through time or in a 
uniform fashion.  This paper explores the pattern and pace of a sample of exporting 
TNC subsidiaries operating in the electronics industry in Thailand.  The analysis 
reveals a wide variety in capability building approaches through time, with some 
subsidiaries failing to develop capabilities and remaining as ‘assembly only’ plants.  
Other more dynamic plants developed process engineering and product design skills, 
investing heavily in capability building.  One common determinant in capability 
building appears to be the overall technology strategy of the parent plant.  In those 
subsidiaries which did not upgrade beyond assembly, technology decisions and 
processes were tightly controlled within the parent headquarter (HQ) locations.  By 
contrast, the more dynamic plants exercised more discretion over local capability 
building.  The latter were relatively decentralised and more open to policies to 
encourage upgrading.  The study suggests that governments should tailor upgrading 
policies not only according to the approximate level of capabilities attained by local 
subsidiaries, but also according to how receptive firms are to upgrading, arguing that 
capability building and policy receptiveness go hand-in-hand.  Other countries hoping 
to upgrade the quality of foreign direct investment might also wish to focus policies 
on the more technologically capable, ambitious and receptive categories of foreign 
subsidiary. 
 
 
 3 
Introduction 
 
Research indicates the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the export led 
growth and technological catching up in several of Asia’s newly industrialising 
economies (NIEs).  Some transnational corporation (TNC) subsidiaries in countries 
such as Singapore and Malaysia have made considerable progress in upgrading their 
technological activities over time.  This progress is sometimes presented in ‘stages’ 
models which try to capture the overall historical progress of TNCs in regions such as 
South East Asia.  However, innovation studies in both developed and developing 
countries consistently show that ‘all firms are not the same’ in their strategies and 
practices towards technology.  Therefore, there is no reason to assume that all firms 
will upgrade technologically through stages.  Nor is there any reason to assume that 
upgrading will occur automatically or in a uniform fashion across firms.  As yet, 
research has not yet examined in any depth the differences in rates and patterns of 
technological upgrading of TNC subsidiaries or the policy implication of any variety 
in upgrading patterns.  
 
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to explore the pace and pattern of TNC 
technological upgrading in one major export sector, electronics, in Thailand.  As in 
the case of other South East Asian economies, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Vietnam, Thailand’s export sector has been dominated by foreign TNC 
subsidiaries producing electronics hardware including consumer goods, computing 
and telecommunications equipment, hard disc drives and semiconductor components.  
It is interesting from a developmental perspective to see whether and to what extent 
technological capability building has occurred across different types of TNCs.  It may 
also be useful from a policy perspective to more deeply understand the trends, 
motivations and limitations of capability building in TNC subsidiaries, so that 
governments are better placed to encourage the upgrading of the quality of 
capabilities in both new and existing FDI.  
 
Because of the lack of previous research on the comparative upgrading paths of TNC 
subsidiaries, an exploratory case study approach was adopted, based on in-depth 
interviews with structured sample of 15 electronics exporting subsidiaries of various 
kinds within Thailand.1  Case material was gathered to explore and compare the 
strategies and practices of different types of TNC towards upgrading.  We were 
especially interested in the motivations, barriers and encouragements to technological 
upgrading and to understand the decision making process regarding capabilities from 
the point of view of the subsidiaries themselves.  Using a simple ‘benchmarking’ 
technique, the research broadly categorised the subsidiaries according to levels of 
technological capability achieved.  Interviews with directors, managers and engineers 
were used to explain the factors which underpinned upgrading paths and decisions.  
The cross-firm comparisons resulted in interesting differences between subsidiaries.  
To complement the cross-case analysis and provide more detailed insights into how 
extensive upgrading can occur, we also present one particular ‘exemplar’ case of 
successful capability building illustrating the stages, processes and strategies involved 
and the motivations underpinned capability building. 
                                                 
1  Thailand is an interesting case as the TNC subsidiaries are often viewed as lacking in technological 
capability and ‘behind’ the levels of more advanced economies such as Singapore and Malaysia (see 
Part 1). 
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The paper proceeds as follows.  Part 1 presents recent research on the technological 
development of TNC subsidiaries in Thailand and other South East Asian economies, 
pointing to the limitations of capability building stages models.  Part 2 presents the 
sample design, method and field evidence examining (a) variety in level of capability 
building and possible explanations for this (e.g. size of firm, product grouping, age of 
firm and corporate strategy) (b) explanations for observed differences, according to 
different categories of TNCs.  Part 3 presents the in-depth case example of an 
American firm (Seagate Technology) which upgraded significantly in Thailand over 
the past two decades, creating a burgeoning of local technological capability within 
the disc drive industry.2  Part 4 assesses implications for industrial and innovation 
policies for governments which are attempting to promote more rapid upgrading 
among TNCs.   
 
Although the focus of the paper is on a single country and one cannot generalise from 
one country to the next, we hope that the findings will have relevance both to other 
South East Asian economies which rely heavily on electronics producing TNCs for 
export growth, and for other developing countries hoping to encourage local TNC 
subsidiaries to increase their rates of technological upgrading. 
 
 
Part 1:  TNCs and Technology Upgrading  
 
Table 1:  Technological Upgrading of TNC Subsidiaries in South East Asia 
 
 Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Vietnam 
1960s Assembly     
1970s Process 
Engineering 
Assembly Assembly   
1980s Product 
Development 
Process 
Engineering 
Assembly Assembly Assembly 
1990s R&D Product 
Development. 
Process 
Engineering 
Process 
Engineering 
Assembly 
 
 
 
Source: based on empirical research (see text for references) 
 
 
Compared with countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, the major South East 
Asian economies have depended to a large extent on TNC subsidiaries for export 
growth.  Table 1 presents a simple ‘stages model’ to summarise research into 
technological upgrading in the electronics sector.  TNC subsidiaries began exporting 
in Singapore, starting with simple assembly operations in the 1960s and progressing 
to more advance process engineering in the 1970s and then to minor product 
improvements in the 1980s (Hobday, 1995).  Research shows an increase in research 
                                                 
2  Although Seagate is not necessarily typical, it represents a useful historical case of successful 
developmental. 
 5 
and development (R&D) during the 1990s as wages rose and skills improved (Wong, 
1992; 1998).   
 
The TNC subsidiaries in Malaysia began their activities in the 1970s, again with 
assembly.  Technology transfer from parents enabled the expansion of export factory 
production and a progressive upgrading of both production processes and the type of 
products being exported.  While there was nothing especially new in TNC technology 
transfer to Malaysia (or indeed Singapore), prior to this TNC investments had 
occurred mainly to serve domestic markets or to engage in tariff hopping, rather than 
export production.   
 
Despite observed technological learning at the plant level and the use of successively 
higher levels of technology, Malaysia and the other South East Asian economies 
remained somewhat behind Singapore through the 1980s and 1990s, lacking in R&D 
and new product development capabilities (Ariffin and Bell, 1998; Bell et al, 1996; 
Rasiah, 1994).  However, the TNC subsidiaries in Malaysia and Thailand acquired 
useful manufacturing process skills and some limited product design capabilities and 
in some cases, limited R&D activities.3  A similar pattern began to appear in 
Indonesia and Vietnam but in these cases the TNCs had yet to achieve the levels of 
capability development of earlier entrants.4  
 
Case study research indicates that, typically, the main focus of the TNC subsidiaries 
has been acquiring and upgrading technical and engineering skills aimed at 
assimilating and improving existing technology, rather than R&D activities for new 
product or process innovation.  Some studies (e.g. in Malaysia) show that the 
subsidiaries struggled for many years to overcome obstacles and invested heavily in 
human resources to acquire technology from their parents.5  Firm-level research in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand shows that some subsidiaries have learned to 
innovate over time and now play significant roles within the overall TNC production 
(e.g. in semiconductors in Malaysia and hard disc drives in Thailand).  
 
Researchers in the field point out that there is nothing ‘automatic’ in these stages of 
development and that they are, at best, merely rough historical representations of 
general progress (Ernst et al. 1998; Hobday, 2003).  These types of models should not 
be used to imply that all firms follow the general path or that, in the future, lagging 
firms will necessarily follow the path of leading firms.  Instead, the proper use of such 
interpretations is in the spirit of Gershenkron who used simple stages models to 
identify deviations, diversity and differences in patterns of development and was 
hostile to using stages models deterministically or in a prescriptive manner 
(Gershenkron, 1962).  However, despite these caveats, as yet there has been very little 
                                                 
3 For stages in general in Thai industry, see Intarakumnerd and Virasa (2002);  for firm-level 
development stages see Chairatana (1997); for electronics in Thailand see Poapongsakorn and 
Tonguthai (1998). 
 
4  See Ca and Anh (1998) for Vietnam and Thee and Pangestu (1998) for Indonesia. 
 
5  See Ngoh (1994) for the case of Motorola and Lim (1991) for the case of Intel. 
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research on whether or not there are different propensities of TNC subsidiaries to 
upgrade technologically.6 
 
From an historical perspective these findings on technological upgrading should not 
be particularly surprising.  They are consistent with early research on international 
product life cycles (Vernon, 1966; 1975) and theories regarding the location of 
production (Dunning, 1975).  Vernon (1966) for example, argued that TNC 
subsidiaries would initially locate production of mature, standardised products in low 
cost locations.  The findings are also consistent with advanced country research on 
how TNCs distribute and integrate their global subsidiary activities (e.g. Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989).  These studies show that TNCs rely on 
their networks of subsidiaries to manufacture and, in some cases, to innovate.  Over 
time, it is natural for some subsidiaries to mature and become world product design 
centres and/or centres of excellence for particular technological activities (Kogut, 
2002; Fratocchi and Holm, 1998) indicating that significant innovative activities have 
transferred to the subsidiary.  Technological improvements by subsidiaries can be an 
effective way to promote the overall growth and competitiveness of the TNC network 
(Egelhoff et al 1998).7   
 
Some research on subsidiary initiatives (Birkinshaw, 1997) criticises earlier studies 
which focused on the contrast between local and global markets in understanding 
subsidiary upgrading (e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989).  Birkinshaw (1997) argues 
that subsidiary initiatives are, in fact, the manifestation of dispersed corporate 
innovation and entrepreneurship.  The initiative process typically involves the 
identification of an opportunity at the subsidiary level, subsequent negotiations with 
the headquarters and, finally, the commitment of resources to a new initiative by the 
HQ.  
 
However, it is clear that in some countries TNC technological upgrading does not 
necessarily occur despite high profile and costly policies of encouragement, as in the 
case of the Brazilian telecommunications sector.  In the developing world, Brazil is 
second only to China with respect to the volume of FDI attracted during the 1990s to 
DCs.  Quantitatively the policy of attracting FDI can be considered successful 
(Lacerda, 2003).  However, from an upgrading perspective there are major concerns.  
For example, to attract and upgrade FDI, tax incentives granted since 1993 to 
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment exceeded US$3 billion over the 
period 1993 to 2003)8.  Case study research suggests that three of eight observed 
subsidiaries (Siemens, Motorola and Ericsson) upgraded their role in the TNC 
network allowing them to participate more strongly in global product development 
(Galina and Plonski, 2002; Galina, 2003; Perini, 2004a,b).  Nevertheless, despite the 
                                                 
6 For a rare exception see Guyton (1994) who argued that Japanese consumer electronics firms were 
reluctant to transfer technology to Malaysia.  This particular study did not examine other TNC 
nationalities, or the impact of ‘age’ of investment in technology transfer performance. 
 
7 These findings were developed mainly within Canada (Birkinshaw, 1997) and then expanded to other 
developed countries where subsidiaries have proved effective in promoting growth (Holm and 
Pederson, 2000; Delany, 1998; Egelhoff et al., 1998).   
 
8 The Information and Communications Technology Law (for details see Brasil 2004, Tax Law.  
Embassy of Brazil in London).  
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large investments output indicators such as patent and publications suggest that 
Brazilian subsidiaries remain fairly insignificant within the overall innovation 
activities of the respective TNCs and R&D remained very limited.  The sustainability 
of these policies is surrounded by great controversy within Brazil. 
 
Within this context, research on electronics within Thailand shows the importance of 
innovation for upgrading at the sectoral level (Brimble 2001) and the varied progress 
of locally-owned firms as they acquire technology (Intarakumnerd and Virasa 2002; 
Chairatana, 1997).  Poapongsakorn and Tonguthai (1998) point to the need for 
technological capability building to sustainability the export success of Thailand in 
both electronics and textiles.  Arnold et al (2000) provide general guidance on how to 
assess and enhancing policy support for industrial technology development within 
Thailand.  Unfortunately, there is little published firm or sectoral level data on 
electronics within Thailand, especially with respect to the exporting TNC subsidiaries.  
Therefore, we adopted an multi firm exploratory study to enable in-depth case 
research and cross-firm comparisons to begin to build a picture of technological 
progress in this sector.  
 
 
Part 2: Analysing the TNC Subsidiaries in Thailand 
 
2.1 Method and approach 
Electronics exports from Thailand, as in other fast growing countries of South East 
Asia, are mostly based on two types of TNC subsidiary, called here ‘primary’ and 
‘first-tier’.  Primary TNCs are those which first came to Thailand, usually to produce 
finished goods or components.  As the initial plant investments they tend to start with 
simple assembly operations and then incrementally learn production technology 
according to decisions taken by the foreign corporate HQ.  First-tier TNCs are 
suppliers of components and semi-finished products, which came later to Thailand, 
usually to supply the primary TNCs with necessary inputs as production expands.  
Sometimes first-tier firms then diversify to produce not only for their primary TNC 
customers but also for the wider international market.  
 
To analyse subsidiary upgrading, a combination of methods was required, including 
documentation analysis, questionnaires for gathering data on capability development, 
and a method for comparing upgrading across firms.  Following standard methods for 
multiple case study research, we built up a sample of firms sufficient in number to 
examine the paths and patterns of technological progress at the individual firm level, 
and to compare and contrast results across firms (Pauwells and Matthyssens, 2004; 
Straus and Corbin, 2004; Yin, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994; and Eisenhardt, 
1991).  As with all exploratory research, the intention was not to generalise our 
findings to the entire population but to establish robust findings and arguments for 
further study.  By choosing a diverse range of cases, we were able to explore variety 
in patterns of change and to interrogate findings by comparing results across firm size, 
product range, ownership, corporate strategy and duration of operation.   
 
In order to assess the level and path of upgrading, a questionnaire was designed based 
on the previous studies which examine the movement of firms through levels of 
capabilities (e.g. Bessant et al, 2001; Arnold et al 2000).  We used a simple ‘staircase 
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model’ of capabilities running from weak (Level A), moderate (Level B), strong 
(Level C) to very strong (Level D).  We then adapted the staircase model to 
correspond to main technological stages described in Table 1 above, where Level A 
corresponds to assembly activities, Level B to process engineering, Level C to 
product development, and Level D to R&D capabilities.  
 
Within the framework, firms which focus on assembly (Level A) have little need for 
technological effort or investment beyond maintaining production process quality.  
They will tend to have a small number of technicians and engineers focused on 
production quality.  Process engineering oriented firms (Level B) will generally 
employ substantial numbers of technicians and engineers, and will be capable of 
setting up, modifying and perhaps making minor improvements to production process 
technology. Firms which concentrate on product development (Level C) will have 
mastered process engineering and have the capabilities to design new products and 
organise production processes for these new products.  Level C is a wide band that 
incorporates firms with the ability to make incremental improvement to existing 
products and those with the capabilities for designing new products.  These firms will 
employ a significant number of design engineers and may well have a formal product 
engineering department.  Firms with R&D capabilities (Level D) will have a full 
complement of process and product engineering, and substantial R&D capabilities 
and will typically have an R&D department.  While other firms may carry out some 
limited R&D, to be included in this category a firm would have to be able to 
contribute to the world technology frontier through R&D via the generation of new 
products or processes.  As noted, firms may pass through the various stages as they 
develop, but there is nothing automatic about progress.  
 
The purpose of the framework and questionnaire was not to achieve a precise measure 
of capability but to gain a rough benchmark to assess each TNC plant and compare 
them against each other.  For each firm, case material was gathered on numbers of 
R&D, engineering and technician staff, types of equipment used, the main focus of 
production activities, relationships with HQ, tools and frameworks for analysing 
technology, links with local institutions and suppliers, the decision making process 
with respect to technology, future strategies and areas of technical strength and 
weakness.  Historical information was also gathered on technological progress, 
milestones and difficulties in order to roughly gauge the progress of each firm since 
start up.  External sources of information on the company’s history, number of 
employees, turnover and products manufactured were also gathered (e.g. from the 
Internet), checked and updated during the interviews.   
 
2.2  Sample design 
As noted earlier, the electronics sector was chosen because it is the largest industrial 
export sector in Thailand and has led the country’s export growth over the past two 
decades or so.  It is also likely to continue to be important to Thailand’s future 
international trade.  Table 2 presents details of the firms audited.  To protect 
confidentiality, code numbers were allocated instead of company names, according to 
size, product type, age of firm and so on (see Table for an explanation of the coding 
system).  Fifteen firms were selected according to the two types of TNC (primary and 
first-tier) identified above.  The choice of 15 firms was largely determined by 
convention regarding multiple case study research, and determined by the need (a) to 
gather sufficient data for understanding each case in depth and (b) to make cross firm 
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comparisons.  The choice of 15 firms enabled us to structure a sample sufficiently 
large to make comparisons according to: (a) ownership of the firm, comparing most of 
the various foreign-owned nationalities (e.g. American, Japanese, European, Korean 
and Taiwanese were included);  (b) the various types of product manufactured (see 
below); (d) different categories of company size; and (e) length of operation within 
Thailand.  The sample enabled us to explore whether any observed differences in 
technological capability building related to these factors in any way. 
 
Regarding limitations, the sample does not necessarily correspond to the overall 
structure of the Thai electronics industry in terms of population of electronics firms or 
total value of production.  This is partly because there is a lack of basic data on the 
overall industry (e.g. total employment, sales and exports by product type) and no 
published studies of TNCs operating within the sector.  Nevertheless, both large and 
very large firms were included and the sample did include a significant share of the 
overall industry with a total employment of more than 43,000 staff.  Also, the sample 
was sufficiently large to capture several of the key causes of variety in terms of 
technology capability paths.   
 
As described in Table 2, the 15 TNC suppliers were made up of eight primary 
electronic product and component exporters (code T1) and seven first-tier suppliers 
(T2) of finished components, component parts, and sub-assemblies to primary 
companies).  First tier supplier firms generally followed primary firms into Thailand 
and were generally more recent entrants.  We learned that most of these firms had 
expanded their customer base to supply other TNCs outside of Thailand.  Like 
primary firms, all first tier suppliers production was for export, either directly or 
indirectly via primary firms.   
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Table 2:  TNC Subsidiary Sample: Electronics in Thailand 
 
Firm Category and 
Code Name9 
Start Date Plant 
Employment 
2002 
Overall 
Audit Level 
Export 
market  
Share10  
Owner 
ship11 
Main Product 
Lines 
Business/ 
Technology 
strategy 
Qualified 
engineers 
(total)12 
%  of 
engin-
eers13  
          
Type T1: Primary 
TNCs X8 
         
T1AUV 1982 13000 C 100% US HDD 
manufacture 
and test 
Upgrade to 
higher 
technology 
manufacture 
500 3.8% 
T1BEV 1974 4100 B-C 100% Europe
an 
Semiconductor 
assembly and 
test 
Upgrade to 
higher 
technology mfr. 
120 2.9% 
T1CTL 1990 2000 B-C 100% Taiwan
-ese 
PC display and 
monitor 
production 
Upgrade to 
higher 
technology mfr 
106 5.3% 
T1DUL 
 
 
1984 1500 C 100% US Semiconductor 
assembly and 
test 
Upgrade to 
higher 
technology mfr 
150 10% 
T1EJL 
 
1990 1100 A-B 100% Japane
se 
Semiconductor 
assembly and 
test 
Mature product 
assembly 
60 5.5% 
T1FTL 
 
1989 1029 A-B 100% Taiwan
-ese 
Resistor 
assembly and 
test 
Mature product 
assembly 
40 (e) 3.9%  
T1GJL 
 
2000 1000 A-B 100% Japane
se 
Printer, fax, PC 
assembly 
Mature product 
assembly 
30 (e) 3.0%  
TIHJL 
 
2000 980 A-B 100% Japane
se 
Semiconductor 
assembly and 
test 
Mature product 
assembly 
35 (e) 3.6% 
 
Type T2 – First-tier 
TNC suppliers X7 
         
T2IJL 
 
 
1987 4,500 A-B 100% Japane
se 
Audio 
components 
(wide variety) 
Mature 
component 
assembly  for 
TNCs 
300 6.7% 
T2JJL 
 
 
1985 3500 A-B 100% Japane
se 
Telecom 
components 
Mature 
component 
assembly  for 
TNCs 
120 3.4% 
T2KKL 
 
 
1991 440 A-B 100% Korean Audio/telecom 
components 
Mature 
component 
assembly  for 
TNCs 
11 2.5% 
                                                 
 
Notes/explanations 
9  Explanation of coding (using first example, TIAUV): 
T1 = Type of TNC (T1, T2) 
A =  Alphabetical code of company interviewed (A-O, i.e. 1-15) 
U = Ownership: U=US, J=Japan, E-Europe, T=Taiwan, K=Korea, M=Malaysia; L=Local (Thai), 
Q=Japan-Taiwan joint venture 
V = Company size by employment (refers to plant audited, not to company overall): V = very large  
   (>3000); L = Large (1000-2999); M= Medium Size (300-999); S=Small (10-299);  
10  Includes both direct exports and indirect (i.e. components for TNCs destined for export); 
11  Q = Japanese-Taiwanese joint venture; 
12  Defined according to job task (e.g. design or production engineering); normally with batchelors or masters 
 degree in engineering 
13  Calculated as percentage of total staff (not including technicians); estimates marked ‘e’ 
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Table 2 (cont’d):  TNC Subsidiary Sample: Electronics in Thailand 
 
T2LQM 
 
 
1992 340 A 100% Japane
se-
Taiwan
-ese 
Joint 
Ventur
e 
PC and TV 
components 
Mature 
component 
assembly   
for TNCs 
10 2.9% 
T2MJM 
 
 
1995 320 A-B 100% Japane
se 
Components 
for audio, 
computers 
Mature 
component 
assembly for 
TNCs 
10 3.1% 
T2NMM 
 
 
1999 300 C Local Malay-
sian 
Equipment and 
components for 
HDD assembly 
Equipment 
supply for 
TNCs 
20  6.6% 
T2OUS 
 
 
2000 30 C Local US Equipment for 
PCB14 
assembly 
Equipment 
supply for 
TNCs 
8 (e) 2.7% 
 
 
To assess the role, if any, of ownership nationality, the sample included most 
nationalities including six Japanese companies, three American, one European, two 
Taiwanese, one Korean, one Malaysian and one Japanese-Korean joint venture.  In 
order to see whether plant size influenced innovation progress, the sample covered a 
wide spectrum of sizes with four plants ‘very large’ (defined as having more than 
3000 employees) and five large (having between 1000 and 2999 employees).  A 
further five were medium sized (with between 301 and 1000 employees) and one was 
small (10-299 employees).   
 
The electronics exporting industry in Thailand consists of several product families.  In 
order to see whether product family related to capability building, a wide range of 
products and components were included in the sample, covering most of the 
electronics product groups made in Thailand.  Some firms produced more than one 
product line and operated in more than one particular sub-sector.  The main product 
lines represented in the sample were: 
• Semiconductor (integrated circuit) assembly and testing: 4 cases 
• Other components (e.g. resistors and transformers): 2 cases 
• Hard disc drives (HDD) and HDD components: 2 cases 
• Audio equipment and components: 3 cases 
• Telecommunications products and components: 2 cases 
• PC and TV monitors and components: 2 cases 
• Complete PC and PC components: 2 cases 
• Machinery for assembly: 2 cases 
• General printed circuit board assembly (PCBA): 1 case 
 
The sample included a spread of start-up dates in order to see whether the age of the 
plant influenced the degree of capability, the presumption being that more recent 
entrants may not yet have had time to establish their technological roots, whereas 
earlier entrants have had more time to build up capabilities.  Dates of incorporation in 
Thailand included four cases if recent entrance (from 1999 to 2002), five cases of start 
                                                 
14 PCB = Printed circuit board. 
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ups between 1990 and 1995, four cases of start up between 1984 and 1989, and two 
cases of start ups prior to 1984.  
 
2.3  Capability development comparisons 
The study results revealed a wide spread of capabilities across different electronics 
sub-sectors, ownership nationalities and plant sizes in Thailand, although almost all 
had progressed beyond level A (assembly) to process (level B) and product 
engineering (level C).   
 
Of the sample of 15 firms, one fitted into the assembly category, eight were spread 
around the upper band of assembly and the lower band of process firms (on the 
boundary between level A and B).  Two plants were located between process and the 
product engineering categories (B and C) with most focussing on process but with 
some design capability.  The remaining four firms were fully designated product 
engineering firms with one or two of these conducting some limited R&D.  Not 
surprisingly, none of the subsidiaries were capable of contributing to the world 
technology frontier through R&D or new generation products (Level D), although 
several were engaged in new product development activities.  The one assembly only 
firm was a Japanese-owned first tier supplier.  Of the eight on the boundary between 
assembly and process, six were Japanese-owned, one was Korean and one Taiwanese 
(four were primary firms and four were first tier suppliers).  Of the product 
engineering firms, our third category, three were American and one Malaysian-
owned.  
 
During the interviews, various possible explanations for different rates of 
technological upgrading were developed and explored.  For example, was this due to:  
(a) the nature of the product type or family?  (b) the stage of development of the firm 
(as proxies by the date of incorporation)? (c) the size of the firm and plant in 
question?  or (d) the corporate and technology strategy of the HQ?  It is useful to 
review the finding against each of these possible explanations in turn. 
 
First, regarding the nature of the product type or family, a lack of technological 
progress did not appear to relate to the nature of the product in question.  In some 
areas (e.g. semiconductors) some firms had quickly moved beyond the 
assembly/process categories, onto product engineering developments, having invested 
substantially in engineering capability (e.g. T1DUL and T1BEV), whereas others in 
the same product family had made little progress (e.g. T1EJL).  In other product areas 
too (e.g. audio and telecommunications) there were examples of both 
assembly/process and product engineering firms, indicating that product type was not 
a determining feature of efforts towards local capability building. 
 
Second, as far as stage of development is concerned, some firms had started more 
than a decade ago (e.g. T1FTL, T1EJL and T21JL) but had remained at the first two 
levels.  Others had entered at approximately the same time (or more recently) and had 
built significant technological capabilities (e.g. T2NMH, T2OUS and L1QLL), 
indicating that start-up date (as a proxy for phase of development) was not a major 
factor in capability building.   
 
Third, turning to the size of the plant in question, again, this did not appear to be a key 
factor in capability development.  On the contrary, two of the smaller firms were at 
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the product engineering level, while some of the larger firms were categorised as 
falling within the assembly or process categories.  Also, some small and medium 
sized firms were also of the assembly/process type, suggesting that firm size was not a 
significant factor in technology development. 
 
Fourth, the corporate technology strategy explanation appeared to carry more weight 
as an explanatory factor.  Analysis of the eight assembly/process boundary level 
TNCs (plus the one fully fledge assembly level firm) shows that six were Japanese-
owned, one was Korean, one Taiwanese, and one a Thai-Japanese joint venture.  By 
contrast, most of the higher scoring TNCs were American- and European-owned.  As 
discussed below in more detail, the main explanation had to do with the technology 
strategies adopted by the Asian TNCs (Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese firms).  
Technology decision-making within the subsidiaries appeared to be tightly controlled 
by the parent HQs and only that technology strictly required for assembly was 
transferred or developed locally by the subsidiary.  This applies both to the  primary 
TNC producers and even more so to the first-tier suppliers.  Although designated as 
assembly-process level firms, the interviews revealed that these firms employed 
highly competent and experienced managers and engineers.  However, they operated 
within a corporate environment where technology, capital (and other) investment 
decisions took place mostly in the HQ location (e.g. in Japan or in Korea) and their 
task was to implement these decisions efficiently.  Decisions not to develop 
technology in Thailand appeared to be part of a wider, coherent strategy towards 
global markets and technologies.  This is not in any way a negative assessment, but 
simply reflects the decision to retain technological (and usually marketing and 
financial) control within the parent headquarters, sometimes jointly with leading (e.g. 
Japanese) customers and technology/equipment suppliers within the HQ country.  It is 
also conceivable that this could be partly the result of geographical proximity to the 
local subsidiary.  American and European subsidiaries were much further away from 
their respective HQs than the Asian ones perhaps encouraging more decentralisation.   
 
For the more passive subsidiaries, decisions were taken to focus efforts on assembly 
and manufacture rather than process development.  The data show that even this 
‘more limited’ task requires substantial technical and engineering support to ensure 
efficiency and to make minor improvements to flows of production and so on.  For 
example, the case of one Japanese firm (T21JL) although categorised as assembly-
process (Levels A-B) employed around 300 engineers (6.7% of total staff).  Other 
firms in this grouping also employed significant numbers of engineers in order to 
ensure efficiency and flexibility in output.  The main role of this (substantial) 
engineering effort appeared to be organisation and improvement of the shop-floor 
activities which underpin productivity of assembly operations. 
 
However, within the more tightly controlled decisions and technology structures of 
the Asian TNCs there was little plant level demand for significant technology 
upgrading because of the wider corporate strategy.  These strategic differences 
appeared to be aligned with nationality, with Japanese and other Asian firms opting 
for a more centralised technology strategy approach, and Western (US and European) 
firms tending towards a more decentralised approach.  However, it is important to 
note that these differences were a matter of degree.  The more decentralised American 
and European plants, for example, only went ‘so far’ in capability building and the 
local subsidiaries did not have complete autonomy, as one would expect.  In the 
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American owned firms, for example, final decisions on capital and technology 
investments were taken at the parent headquarters (or in close consultation with the 
HQ) based on the relative advantages of different locations in other parts of Asia and 
elsewhere.  However, if subsidiary managers could make a case for local upgrading, 
and the parent HQs saw benefits in a relatively high degree of technology 
decentralisation and the building up of local subsidiary capabilities, then investments 
could take place.  By contrast, in the case of Japanese owned firms, for example, there 
was little propensity for local technology upgrading beyond that required for current 
manufacturing (which in itself can be quite demanding), and therefore, as argued 
below, little receptiveness to government policies for upgrading.  
 
The two American primary firms (producing semiconductors and hard disc drives) 
had progressed quite far in terms of capability building, and both were product 
engineering (Level C) subsidiaries.  Generally, the first-tier TNC suppliers lagged 
behind the primary TNCs, being mainly assembly – process companies, again mostly 
Japanese owned.  Of the two most dynamic process engineering companies, one was 
American-owned and one Malaysian-owned.  Both of these produced equipment 
rather than components, and both had produced or were developing new equipment 
for the Thai electronics industry in collaboration with their parent companies, 
suggesting the small beginnings of a capital goods equipment industry in electronics 
in Thailand. 
 
2.4  Factors underlying capability upgrading in primary TNCs 
As Table 2 shows, of the eight primary firms, three (two American and one European) 
could be identified as being process – product (Levels B-C), indicating significant 
technological capability and strategies in place for further technological upgrading.  
These firms were dynamic companies operating under fairly decentralised corporate 
strategies.  They had demonstrated their capabilities and were given encouragement 
by HQ to expand and move up the value chain of activities that, in turn, required them 
to absorb substantial engineering capabilities for operating and developing 
manufacturing processes.  The three firms were strongly networked into other 
subsidiaries and the parent HQ, so that they could assimilate knowledge, solve local 
problems and move to new processes and products quickly.  The three benefited from 
organisational innovations such as continuous improvement, quality circles and 
statistical process control methods as well as local engineering capacity.  However, 
they had not yet moved onto significant new product development, nor R&D.  
Nevertheless, they looked forward to building new capabilities in the future and were 
open to linkage forming within the local economy.  They were receptive to policy 
encouragement (e.g. participating in government vendor development schemes and 
forming linkages with local technical colleges and universities).   
 
By contrast, four (3 Japanese and 1 Taiwanese) of the eight primary companies were 
assembly – process (Level A-B).  Managers in these four companies were aware of 
technological trends and strategies, but operated within a more controlled corporate 
environment that strictly limited local innovation activities.  The parent strategies 
were centralised in the sense that that there was very little need to upgrade subsidiary 
capabilities beyond that required for current production needs, as decisions and 
developments were conducted in the HQ.  In contrast to the US and European TNCs, 
these firms were geographically much closer to their HQs and this fact might have 
played a role in the ‘closeness’ of the parent HQ relationship.  In these cases, almost 
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all significant engineering decision-making (e.g. choice of capital goods, installation 
of machinery, new product and process development) were taken by HQ, sometimes 
linked into customers and suppliers in the home location.15  These firms had acquired 
the engineering and technician capabilities required for assembly operations, often for 
lower cost mature product lines which were no longer produced in the home country.  
The case of one  assembly - process firm (TIEJL) is particularly interesting, as 
although it was in the same product semiconductor family as (TIBEV) and fell into 
the process – product category, it had developed far fewer capabilities, indicating that 
product type, and length of stay, were not the main determinant of technological 
upgrading, but rather the strategy of the company concerned.  Like the more dynamic 
primary companies, the passive subsidiaries were actively engaged in organisational 
innovations including total quality management (TQM), continuous improvement and 
quality circles, important to production efficiency.  Several firms reported that they 
had achieved impressive cost reductions arising from these efforts.  Managers said 
that given their assembly task, their engineers were most appropriately focused on 
achieving operational efficiency in assembly, rather than acquiring additional or new 
technology. 
 
In each primary firm, the main determinant in technological transfer and local 
capability development was overall corporate strategy and, in particular, the way the 
Thai subsidiaries fitted into the international division of technological and production 
activities.  This is not entirely surprising, as it would be highly unlikely that a 
subsidiary would act independently of, or in conflict with, the overall strategy of the 
parent.  In this sample of firms, strategy was closely associated with ownership and 
geographical proximity, and this group of factors appeared to be more closely 
associated with technology capability building say compared with product type or 
date of start up. 
 
Needless to say, in the assembly only plants, no R&D was undertaken or 
contemplated.  These firms represented low cost, basic production capacity for the 
parents.  Although in some cases senior engineers and directors of these plants were 
highly aware of global technological trends and strategies, having relocated from the 
parent plant, in areas such as capital goods modification, technology acquisition and 
implementation, and exploiting external linkages with universities and technical 
colleges, these firms were largely inactive and had very low capabilities in these 
areas, simply because these capabilities were not required within Thailand.  There was 
no need for local technological effort within the business strategy and this was 
reflected in the lack of technological autonomy and discretion at the subsidiary level. 
 
By comparison, the American and European TNCs boasted much stronger capabilities 
(e.g. in HDDs and semiconductors).  The one European firm (T1BEV) had 
considerable technological strengths in capital goods selection and implementation, 
production engineering, product-process engineering, incremental product 
improvement, and had a range of projects for new technology developments 
underway at the local plant supported by locally trained engineers and managers.    
 
 
                                                 
15  For example in cases T1EJL and T1HJL new product decisions were made at HQ in consultation 
with the suppliers of capital goods.  These decisions were then relayed to the subsidiary. 
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2.5  Capability building in first-tier TNC subsidiaries 
Evidence from the sample of seven first-tier subsidiaries confirms the above view that 
Japanese and Korean firms tend to operate under more centralised and 
‘technologically closed’ corporate environments than American and European TNCs.  
Four of these firms had reached the assembly – process level and a further one 
involved only in assembly.  The five had entered Thailand to supply primary firms, 
sometimes at the direct request of the primary TNC exporters, with necessary inputs 
which had previously been imported.  This applied to a wide range of product lines 
including audio, telecom, PC and TV monitors.  Some firms had diversified their local 
client base and exported directly to customers in other external markets. 
 
These five firms were mostly engaged in the production of simple, mature products 
using low cost labour.  Production processes were basic and assembly-oriented.  
Rudimentary technician skills were evident but only those required for current 
assembly needs.  HQ staff took engineering tasks and decision-making with respect to 
production and, when necessary, engineers were dispatched from HQ to resolve 
operational difficulties.  Most production took place on fairly mature, well proven 
lines for standard products no longer produced in the home country of the parent.  In 
these plants, at least up until the time of research, there was no need or demand for 
acquiring technological capabilities. 
 
Within the group of seven first-tier suppliers there were, however, two examples of 
dynamic product engineering subsidiaries (T2OUS and T2NMM).  Both were 
equipment suppliers to the primary TNCs.  One was a medium-sized Malaysian 
company that had entered to supply high technology production machinery to the 
primary TNCs.  The other was a small American subsidiary that also supplied high 
technology assembly equipment.  In both cases, customer demand required relatively 
strong local technological capabilities and a conscious strategy for technology 
acquisition and upgrading was followed.  Neither plant were yet at the stage of 
producing radical new products based on original research but both had significant 
engineering and development capabilities and both looked forward to further 
technology upgrading. 
 
 
Part 3: The Case of Seagate Technology Thailand (STT) 
Among the most successfully upgrading TNCs in Thailand was the American firm 
Seagate Technology Thailand (STT).  As a case study, STT shows in more detail the 
stages a successfully upgrading TNC, running through levels A (assembly), to B 
(process engineering) to C (product development).  It also presents the typical 
motivations, on the part of both the subsidiary and the parent, which underlie 
extensive technological capability building.  Furthermore, it indicates the length of 
time it takes to upgrade, taking several decades to achieve its relatively advanced 
stage.   
 
Within Thailand, the subsidiary grew from around 50 employees in 1982 to more than 
35,000 in 1999.  In order to expand assembly and engineering and to achieve higher 
quality, STT invested considerably in training and process engineering in the area of 
hard disc drive (HDD) production.  The local subsidiary earned itself a corporate wide 
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reputation for innovative process design, high quality output and low defect 
production.  As a result of plant expansion, second-tier TNCs entered Thailand to 
support STTs operations.  Substantial technology transfer was made possible through 
local technological efforts, with foreign engineers and managers being replaced by 
Thai staff, up to and including chief executive officer level.   
 
Level A: start up and assembly production  
STT began as a very small HDD assembly operation with around 50 employees in 
1982.  The company was the first foreign HDD producer to set up in Thailand.  By the 
late 1990s, STT employed the largest concentration of Seagate employees world-wide 
and almost half of the company's total employees.  All of STTs production was for the 
export market, mostly for other Seagate plants. 
 
 
Table 3  STTs five production plants  
 
 Location  Establishment   Total  
    Date   Employment 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Plant 1 - Chockchai -   1987    3,329 
Plant 2 - Teparuk plant - 1988    13,267 
Plant 3 - Rangsit -   1994   1,959 
Plant 4 - Wellgrow-   1994    7,695 
Plant 5 - Korat   1996     8,442 
 
Total        34,692  
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source:  Interviews, Company Reports 
 
 
In the late 1990s, the three main production process steps carried out in Thailand were 
(a) head assembly (b) stack assembly and (c) drive assembly.  Seagate in Singapore 
carried out the next stage in the process which is the final assembly of the HDD. 
(Malaysia and China also carried out drive assembly).  The main Chokchai plant 
focused on two HDD product lines, low cost desk top PC HDDs, and high cost, high 
performance workstation PCs.  The various components for the HDDs were imported 
or purchased locally, but not produced in the Chokchai plant which concentrated on 
assembly which is a highly complex, multi-stage process. 
 
Level B: early technology transfer 1982-1988 
When STT began in 1982, the main motivation for locating in Thailand was low 
labour costs.  Although production scale was very small (i.e. assembly shop), high 
profit margins soon induced Seagate to begin production in many different locations 
around the Bangkok area.  This expansion proceeded rapidly in various buildings on 
an ad hoc basis, driven by the need for capacity expansion.  Although small scale, 
even at this early stage (1982-1988) the quality required and the nature of the 
assembly process itself demanded fairly intensive technical support.  Around 15-20% 
of employees were engineers and technicians, including a high proportion of foreign 
engineers during this period.  Technology was initially transferred informally by the 
more experienced foreign engineers to local engineers and technicians.  As local 
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technical staff became more experienced and more senior, they in turn recruited and 
trained new Thai staff. 
 
Substantial technical support was required not only for plant start up, but also to 
monitor and control HDD yields, ensure consistency of materials and the high quality 
and reliability expected by the HDD buyers (mostly large PC makers, such as IBM, 
Dell and Texas Instruments).  During this period, STT learned the ‘art of HDD 
assembly’ in Thailand, gaining experience in assembly, capital equipment, testing and 
quality technology. 
 
Advanced Level B:  take off and major plant expansion: 1989 onwards 
In 1989, the first major plant, Teparuk, was established, bringing together the small 
units, and marking a new phase of technological capability building.  With increasing 
levels of HDD integration and ever higher quality demands, production became more 
automated and technology-intensive.  Engineering was initially centralised to promote 
support for the various stages of production.  By 1999 STT’s Chokchai plant 
employed around 1,500 technically qualified staff (10% of the total staff employed), 
of whom around 500 were engineers and 1,000 or so technicians of various kinds.  
Engineers cover all the basic tasks of HDD assembly including, plant start up, capital 
goods installation and modification, tooling, maintenance, process engineering 
(including statistic process control), quality engineering, software development and 
failure analysis.  Within engineering, there were 15-20 PhDs, and large numbers of 
masters degree holders.  The minimum qualification for engineer in STT was a 
bachelors degree.  Technicians normally held a qualification of some kind (e.g. a 
diploma).  All staff received substantial in-house organised training and on-the-job 
training.  As a relatively high paying employee within Thailand, STT confronted no 
major shortages of technically qualified staff from local universities and colleges. 
 
In 1999 the central engineering department was re-organised in favour of a distributed 
‘product life concept’ in which all staff, including engineers, were allocated to 
specific product groups.  This strategy, aimed to raise productivity through 
teamworking and to increase the subsidiary’s speed and flexibility in response to 
customer needs.   
 
Level B involved intensive, if incremental ‘behind the technology frontier’, 
innovation.  Competition, both among the corporate subsidiaries and with other HDD 
assemblers located in Thailand, forced the pace of innovation, both within STT and 
the company's major competitors.  As is normally the case with catch up innovation, 
this process did not require much R&D but instead called for incremental 
improvements to manufacturing processes, machinery and equipment, and changes to 
the way production was organised.  
 
To remain competitive in terms of quality and cost, one of the tasks of engineering at 
STT was to remove non-value adding elements from the production process and to 
organise production in the most efficient and flexible way possible.  Routine 
engineering tasks included the improvement and re-configuration of testing 
equipment, tooling, fixtures, quality assurance methods and materials.  Raising 
productivity also depended on more creative, non-routine engineering task and 
problem-solving projects.  One such project began in 1996, which involved the 
creation of a new cell (i.e. team)-based approach to production (of around 55-60 
 19 
operators to each cell).  In order to improve production yields, each production line 
was converted into a semi-permanent team or cell, with the aim of instilling greater 
ownership among staff of processes and problems.  At the start, defect parts per 
million (DPPM) was around 2%, (i.e. 98% yield) considered to be too high, leading to 
substantial rework and waste material.  With the new cell system each time there was 
a problem (e.g. with yield levels or tooling) the production line was shut down and the 
team had a meeting to identify causes and solutions.  Initially, under the new system 
yields fell to 93% (7% DPPM), as groups spent time identifying and resolving process 
problems.  After two weeks or so, overall yield was back up to 95% and by the fourth 
week yields has reached 99.5 to 99.6%. 
 
This organisational innovation brought about significant benefits, for example, in the 
reduction of scrap material, the lowering of inventory and improved quality.  
Productivity continued to rise as a result of the system, leading to current DPPM 
levels of 0.05% (virtually defect free).  American management, surprised by the high 
yields at STT, visited to verify the results and learn about the techniques used.  As a 
result, the cell system spread to the rest of Seagate plants, providing an example of 
‘reverse technology transfer’ from subsidiary to parent. 
 
As with many innovations, the cell system was not without its disadvantages.  Teams 
sometimes got ‘set in their ways’ and it became more difficult for management to 
allocate resources, given the need to maintain cells as units.  The system also called 
for a great deal of training in the initial stages (around 15,000 employees required 
some training).  Re-training was also required to increase cell flexibility (e.g. with 
new product generations) to allow for better overall resource allocation.  A second 
innovation was led by a PhD engineer who devised new analytical technique for 
gathering data for configuring HDD test procedures.  This method was accepted 
internally and then presented to final customers, including IBM, for approval.  Again, 
the system was widely adopted by Seagate, producing significant process 
improvements in testing.  Incremental innovation also applied to some of the capital 
goods used, most of which were imported from the US (e.g. most testing equipment 
was imported).  In the case of tooling, prototypes were purchased from the US, then 
STT engineers tested, maintained and re-programmed the software controls according 
to local needs. 
 
While there was no R&D department in 1999, there was a need for local engineering 
capability to feed back to a new product design centre in Colorado.  US design 
engineers visited the plant regularly, providing a technology channel to the subsidiary 
and vice versa.  In addition, the two operations had a direct data link and, equally 
importantly, kept in touch over the phone to relay back important data to help 
configure new products and processes developed in the US. 
 
The process and nature of capability building  
One interesting dimension of the STT case is the shift from informal to formal 
capability building.  In the early days training was informal, with engineers going 
back and forth to the US for training on particular aspects of HDD production.  By the 
late 1990s, training and retraining was highly organised.  Each employee received 
roughly four weeks training per year.  The training department, which employed 
between 100 and 300 people at the Chokchai plant, depending on training needs, was 
responsible for delivering training to the 15,000 employees.  During times of change 
 20 
(e.g. the introduction of new product lines) new trainers were recruited in from the 
operating lines, expanding the training department up to the 300 level.  All operators 
received initial, formal training in the ‘classroom’ and then on-the-job, and all 
received a training certificate once they have passed a test.  All technicians and 
engineers also received regular training.  Training, as with most activities, was carried 
out in the Thai language, with the addition of a few technical English terms. 
 
A second dimension of capability building was the need to begin to develop a supply 
chain within Thailand.  Most of the key components (e.g. read/write heads, wafers 
and sliders) were imported from the US and Singapore.  Only relatively simple 
products were purchased locally (e.g. wire).  However, several major foreign 
suppliers followed Seagate into Thailand, forming a first tier of TNC suppliers to the 
local plant (e.g. Minibea and TPW) to supply components such as springs and stacks.  
TPW, for example, entered from Singapore to supply stacks for the STT plant.  
Overall, according to managers, there were too few local suppliers to support the 
needs of STT and imports continued at a high level. 
 
A third facet of capability building in this case was the eventual forming of linkages 
with external public sector organisations.  Up until 1996, STT was too focused on its 
own growth to develop linkages with university groups and government 
organisations.  However, in 1999 the firm began discussing issues with Asian Institute 
of Technology and several of the major universities.  STT had begun to donate 
equipment to support university R&D and offered a class on HDD technology.  STT 
saw the benefits flowing in both directions, with the universities better able to support 
STT with inputs of personnel as a result of closer collaboration. 
 
A fourth dimension of capability building was the devolution of some decision 
making to the local plant.  Given the very short product life cycles for HDDs (as low 
as 6 to 9 months in some cases), local speed and flexibility of STT were key factors 
driving capability development.  STT needed to be able to take independent decisions 
in the manufacturing.  However, as a subsidiary the plant had no say in overall 
corporate strategy, including new product development, future sales or marketing.  
Nevertheless during the latter stages, it had become closely involved in the 
corporation’s manufacturing strategy.  By the late 1990s, the local Chief Executive 
Officer, an engineer by training, a Thai, had become a Senior Vice President of the 
company.  One of his tasks was to feed back new manufacturing developments to the 
board.  Regarding new plant expansions, changes to process, volume targets and so 
on, these were proposed by STT, discussed and agreed with HQ.  Implementation was 
then a matter for STT.  By 1999 there were very few foreign ex-patriots involved and 
most of the senior management and technical staff were Thai nationals. 
 
In summary, the case of STT provides an interesting example of how extensive 
technological capability building can occur through the various stages outlined in Part 
1, within an economy not widely known for its technological achievements.  
However, there were no rigid stages and the case of STT followed its own particular 
path which, as discussed earlier, differed from that of other TNC subsidiaries.  
Interestingly, the technological capability upgrading which went on within STT also 
occurred in STT's main HDD competitors, most of whom operated in Thailand.  STT 
routinely benchmarked its own performance against its rivals, usually when hiring-in 
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engineers from these companies, and found similar technical performance and 
productivity levels.   
 
Part 4:  Policy implications  
While one cannot draw direct lessons for policy from firm level information alone, the 
evidence provides some interesting policy insights both for Thailand for other 
countries wishing to encourage TNC subsidiaries to ‘climb the technology ladder’. It 
is highly likely that in most DCs with substantial FDI a wide variety of capabilities 
exist, as in the case of Thailand.  Therefore, it is probably wise to tailor government 
policies and programmes to the different categories of subsidiary.  It is also highly 
unlikely that any single policy towards upgrading could address the range of different 
capabilities and approaches taken by TNCs.   
 
The evidence suggests that policy should take into account at least two dimensions of 
capability building (a) level of capability achieved and (b) the desire and need of 
firms to upgrade local subsidiaries, which is closely linked to ‘policy receptiveness’.  
Policy receptiveness refers to the extent to which individual TNC are decentralised in 
terms of technology operations and willing and able at the local subsidiary level to 
engage with policies and institutions which support upgrading. 
 
Take for example, assembly firms (level A) which are policy receptive and willing 
and capable of upgrading.  Here government policies might focus on supporting the 
supply of basic technician and engineering skills.  Government may consider 
supporting collaborative projects involving colleges, universities and local technology 
institutes, which look forwards to future technological needs, perhaps centred on 
process engineering, product-process interfacing and product improvement, or vendor 
upgrading programmes to increase the local supply of inputs.  If subsidiaries are able 
to engage productively in such collaborative activities, then they may be able to 
bargain more effectively with their parent HQ for further investments in upgrading, 
say compared with subsidiaries in competing countries which do not have such 
programmes.  Such collaborations may also build up understanding and trust between 
the TNCs and other local actors. 
 
Similarly, policy receptive process engineering-oriented Level B firms might already 
be in a position to work with government agencies, universities and local institutes on 
advanced automation technologies, product design projects and perhaps R&D projects 
in support of process and product design.  This could assist in the supply of human 
resources and encourage a more rapid upgrading than would otherwise be the case.  
Involvement in university MBA programmes might also be useful to support the 
development of the next level of managers required, and professors and students 
might be encouraged to engage in projects involving the development of new strategic 
frameworks for technological acquisition and developments so that priorities can be 
established and addressed.  Progress in upgrading might require a systematic 
searching for local technology solutions to particular business and technology 
problems and local institutes might be able to assist here.  Firms, such as Seagate, 
could be further encouraged explore experimental new approaches to new product 
design and process quality with staff and PhD students at universities.  In the longer-
term, this might assist the receptive subsidiaries to develop an internal capability for 
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R&D and lead on to new public sector support initiatives of the kind common in 
Singapore for example (Wong, 1998; Hobday, 1995). 
 
Firms capable of product improvement and new product development (Level C) 
might benefit from projects involving advanced technical research and business 
strategy development (e.g. focused on technology roadmaps for particular lines of 
product) and the challenging of firms to ‘think outside of the box’ as occurs in some 
MBA projects.  Government may try and encourage consultants or specialist research 
organisations to work with subsidiaries at Level C on advanced projects to develop 
the next generation of capital goods or new products.  
 
Regardless of how capable a firm is, the Thai study suggests that policies to 
encourage upgrading are best not directed at all firms in general, but towards specific 
firms or groups of firms which are receptive to upgrading policies.  There is little to 
be achieved by encouraging subsidiaries to build capabilities if this runs counter to the 
strategy of the parent corporation.  By contrast, policies which focus on receptive 
firms could potentially speed up the rate of upgrading.  It is highly likely that both 
variety in capability and policy receptiveness exists in other countries, which implies 
that that government agencies should focus on firms which are amenable to policies 
for capability building.  It is equally unlikely that TNCs which are highly centralised 
in terms of technology strategy and investment decisions will respond to domestic 
policies for upgrading as there is little need for local capability building.  By contrast, 
where TNCs follow decentralised strategies and where subsidiaries have a degree of 
discretion in technological upgrading, then policy makers have a fertile ground for 
supporting and encouraging capability building.   
 
In Thailand the TNC subsidiaries which were not receptive to upgrading, not only 
tended to be centralised in terms of strategy but also operated within a relatively 
‘closed’ technological environment within Thailand.  In these cases, technology 
decisions were defined by the parent company and subsidiaries were far less open to 
policy encouragement.  Technology requirements for local subsidiaries were decided 
up by the parent according to company’s overall strategy.  In effect, this meant that 
there was little desire to move towards subsidiary level engineering, new product 
development or R&D.  By contrast, TNC subsidiaries (e.g. the more advanced 
American firms such as Seagate Technology Thailand) operated within a more open 
corporate technological system which was amenable to local incentives and 
opportunities for upgrading.  These types of firm could benefit from policies which 
support local engineering developments within the domestic economy. 
 
This does not mean that government agencies need to evaluate firms or to ‘pick 
winners’.  Indeed, they may not have the skills or resources to do this.  In practise, 
receptive firms are fairly easy to identify as they tend to respond to policy initiatives 
and requests for information as they are motivated to exploit external linkages in 
order to make the case for upgrading within the TNC.  In effect, they are ‘self-
selecting’ in terms of policy.  Some of these firms have championed technological 
upgrading in Thailand (e.g. in HDDs and semiconductors) and these same firms might 
be encouraged to further accelerate their pace of capability building.  Their incentive 
is strengthen their corporate case for further upgrading in the light of competition both 
(a) from other subsidiaries of the same firm in other countries and (b) subsidiaries 
from other TNCs in the same country.  Focusing on these firms might enable 
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government to exploit ‘stage accelerating’ opportunities.  Put simply, receptive firms 
should be the focus of policy rather than those which are not receptive to upgrading 
local plants. 
 
If sufficient numbers of subsidiaries in the same sector are policy receptive, policies 
may wish to go beyond encouraging individual firms to upgrade to consider how to 
upgrade networks of receptive firms engaged in similar activities.  For example, the 
Thai Government is keen to encourage ‘clusters’ to develop to promote innovation 
and competitiveness.  Although the electronics sector is not normally targeted as a 
potential cluster, perhaps because of the dominance of foreign-owned TNCs, in some 
product areas (e.g. HDDs) there may well be the potential to encourage the 
formulation of a high technology cluster.  In HDDs, most of the major global 
suppliers had located in Thailand, having followed Seagate into the country.  In 
addition, several first-tier TNC suppliers had entered to supply the primary TNCs, 
forming the early stages of a local supply chain infrastructure for primary TNC 
manufacturers.   
 
In other countries where there is a potential for multiples cases of upgrading, 
governments may wish to encourage network upgrading through co-ordinating bodies 
such as industry associations or universities with relevant technical departments.  This 
kind of approach appears to have worked well in Singapore and Malaysia, helping to 
develop horizontal synergies between firms.  For example, in Malaysia the Penang 
Skill Development Centre was initially an industry supported training and human 
resource institute.  Today it plans for, promotes and supports the training and 
technical support needs of a large semiconductor exporting cluster in Penang.  The 
Centre is now supported by government in recognition of its important role.  In both 
Singapore and Malaysia, TNCs are encouraged to work together on common technical 
problems and to support human resource developments for future needs.  In addition, 
forward looking firm-university programmes of technology development, including 
research into new products and investments in public sector technical training, are 
deployed to encourage upgrading across groups of firms. 
 
Government agencies and industry associations may also wish to address barriers to 
upgrading in specific technical fields.  For example, if there are gaps in the supply of 
basic components, machinery, services, materials and human resources which could 
and ‘should’ be available locally, but are not available, subsidiaries are forced to 
import these inputs.  However, if there is sufficient local demand from a group of 
TNC subsidiaries it may be possible to encourage local investments to fill such gaps.  
For example, in Thailand’s electronics sector there were shortages in the area of tool 
making services, castings development, nickel plating services, surface mounting 
support and cables.  Each of these areas could be a focus for government-sponsored 
training and human resource development perhaps based in technical colleges and 
universities.  Also, if there are difficulties in the basic infrastructure needed for high 
technology manufacturing, such as in electricity and water supply, it is wise for policy 
makers locally and nationally to address these as they might be preventing receptive 
firms to upgrade or imposing additional costs on upgrading. 
 
In the case of electronics, firms of all capability levels in Thailand found it necessary 
to train their own engineers, as universities and technical colleges did not fully 
prepare graduates for the kinds of tasks they had to undertake within the subsidiaries.  
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However, some of the leading universities (e.g. King Mongut) had a strong track 
record in setting up engineering and information technology courses relevant to 
Thailand’s future needs.  Professors from King Mongut University had assessed the 
needs of the TNCs and agreed, with the TNCs, changes to their engineering courses in 
order to make their activities more relevant to students’ future employers. 
 
Furthermore, publicly-funded training institutes might be a route to supporting TNC 
upgrading.  In the case of Thailand, the Thai-German Institute, a collaborate project 
with the German Government, operates in a zone, north of Bangkok and was 
developing its curricula with the participation of TNC subsidiaries.  This Institute, 
recently established, focused on providing engineering training where shortages 
existed (e.g. tool and die technology).  It incorporated modern facilities and hired 
local Thai professors to run engineering and management courses relevant to the 
electronics producers in Thailand.  It was supported by the Thai Ministry of Industry 
which subsidised courses up to 70% of its cost.  Another, the Japan-Thai Institute, 
also provided useful training to complement firm level training schemes.  Such 
initiatives may prove useful and relevant to other nations seeking to upgrade from 
assembly level to technology-intensive production. 
 
In the case of Thailand, one reason why Government is seeking to become more 
intensively involved in TNC upgrading is the growing competition from firms in other 
countries (e.g. China) which not only benefit from lower labour costs but also from an 
abundance of technically skilled labour.  To meet low cost competition, more 
advanced countries such as Thailand need to constantly improve their overall 
infrastructure for FDI, or they may see a falling off in TNC investments in favour of 
China and other lower cost countries.  In the case of HDDs in Thailand, the major 
TNCs had begun setting up plants in China.  In order to sustain their presence in 
Thailand, the local subsidiaries had to consistently upgrade.  However, this upgrading 
process lacked an infrastructure of support which, for example, included public sector 
programmes of skills and technology development and collaborative technology 
projects.  In the case of Thailand, Government could therefore support the HDD 
industry to maintain its competitive advantage over China by encouraging capabilities 
which underpin not only operating efficiency but also new product development and 
research.  Such opportunities may also be relevant to other countries with a substantial 
TNC subsidiary base which is under threat of competition from China and other low 
cost locations. 
 
Policies for capability upgrading not only need to differentiate between different 
categories of firms and their level of receptiveness, they also need to adapt and 
respond to constantly changing conditions in order to lead firms forward in capability 
building to support competitiveness.  All this indicates that policy making in this area 
is a complex and dynamic process and that relevant, up-to-date information is needed 
by policy agencies on a continuous, and low cost, basis.  One very useful source of 
information and advice is the policy receptive firm itself.  Receptive firms could 
potentially be used provide information and advice on: (a) appropriate government 
strategies for accelerating firm level technological upgrading; (b) how to expand 
foreign direct investment in new areas; (c) how to overcome supply chain problems; 
(d) develop cluster potentials; and (d) how to improve the supply of human resources 
from within public sector organisations such as universities and technical colleges.  
Feedback from the firms interviewed, showed that managers often have a good 
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understanding of the problems and opportunities their plants face in the competitive 
environment in Thailand.  This may well apply to other countries. 
 
Conclusion 
Although electronics is the leading export sector in Thailand and other South East 
Asian economies, its future progress cannot be taken for granted, especially with the 
entry of China into this sector (Lall and Albaladejo, 2003).  It is important that the 
TNC subsidiaries which dominate this industry continually upgrade their capabilities 
and move towards more technologically advanced production, or they may well lose 
their competitive edge.  Our study of 15 TNC subsidiaries in Thailand, however, 
shows that a wide distribution of capabilities exist among firms with some companies 
progressing much further than other in building technological capabilities.  Some 
remained at assembly only (Level A), others had moved from assembly to develop 
process-engineering capabilities (Level B) while others such as STT had moved 
forward to incorporate product innovation skills (Level C).   
 
Analysis of the nine TNCs with relatively weak capabilities suggests that technology 
decision-making was tightly controlled by parent HQ and only that technology strictly 
required for assembly was transferred by the parent or developed locally by the 
subsidiary.  This applied not only to the primary TNC producers but also, and even 
more so, to their first-tier suppliers.  In the case of these less dynamic TNCs, non-
routine engineering decision-making (e.g. the choice of capital goods, installation of 
machinery, new product development and process innovation) were undertaken by the 
parent in the HQ location.  Decisions not to develop technology within Thailand were 
not negative or obstructive, but were part of a coherent corporate strategy towards 
global markets and technologies.  Indeed, the evidence shows that substantial 
technical and engineering capability is required even in these, more ‘passive’ plants.   
 
By contrast, the six more advanced TNCs had developed significant engineering 
capabilities and had strategies in place for further technological upgrading.  These 
firms operated under relatively decentralised regimes, where offshore subsidiaries 
were encouraged to move up the value chain of production activities.  Although these 
firms had not yet moved onto significant new product development or R&D, they had 
strong engineering and process innovation skills and looked forward to building more 
advanced capabilities in the future.  They were also open to linkage forming within 
the local economy and receptive to policy encouragement, unlike the less advanced 
subsidiaries which operated in more ‘closed’ corporate technological structures.  For 
all firms, a major factor in local capability development was the TNC’s overall 
corporate strategy and in particular the way in which Thai subsidiaries fitted into the 
international division of corporate technological and production activities. 
 
The research suggested various policy mechanisms to encourage upgrading according 
to the approximate capabilities of TNC subsidiaries.  These ranged from a greater 
supply of basic technician and process engineering skills, through to projects to 
encourage new product development and R&D.  Specific human resource and 
infrastructural barriers were identified (e.g. in areas such as tool and die making, 
castings, plating services and surface mounting technology) where shared facilities, 
supported by government have proved useful in other countries (e.g. Singapore and 
Hong Kong).  Collaborative research projects for new generations of technology 
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might also encourage TNC to look forward to future upgrading challenges and assist 
them in their upgrading negotiations with their parent HQ. 
 
However, an important argument of the study, is that regardless of how capable a 
subsidiary is technologically, government policies are best directed towards those 
companies which are most receptive to upgrading.  There is little to be gained by 
encouraging firms to build capabilities if this runs counter to the existing strategy of 
the parent corporation.  Capability building and policy receptiveness seem to go hand 
in hand.  Fortunately, policy receptive firms are likely to make their position well 
known to colleges, universities, training institutes and government agencies as it is in 
their best interest to support the building of a local ‘upgrading infrastructure’. 
 
Other countries may also confront variety in the capability levels of foreign 
subsidiaries, propensities of firms to upgrade, and policy receptiveness of TNC 
subsidiaries towards upgrading.  If this is the case, then policy makers in other 
countries may also wish to consider differentiating policies according to levels of 
capability and receptiveness in order to focus their efforts to maximum effect.  The 
evidence from Thailand suggests that it is wise to target policies towards groups of 
TNCs which are policy receptive and willing and capable of upgrading, rather than 
‘all firms’ regardless of their technology strategies and ambitions.   
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